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Democratic Theorists and Party Scholars:
Why They Don’t Talk to Each Other, and
Why They Should
Ingrid van Biezen and Michael Saward
Despite their importance to one another, the current literatures on political parties and normative democratic theory continue to
develop largely in mutual isolation. Empirical studies of contemporary political parties and party systems tend to have little to say
about the meanings and possibilities of democracy, and therefore also about the varied potential roles of political parties within it.
Meanwhile, contemporary democratic theorists quietly sidestep the issue of whether political parties perform a legitimate function
in democracies. This lack of mutual engagement is regrettable, in particular given the pervasive erosion of popular support and
legitimacy of political parties as representative institutions. In this article we explore the key reasons for democratic theorists and
scholars of political parties so rarely taking on each others’ core concerns, and we outline the key ways in which this mutual disen-
gagement is mutually impoverishing. We will also suggest ways forward, by pinpointing and illustrating potentially productive areas
of engagement which might serve to deepen our understanding of democracy’s present and its possible futures.
D espite many recent successful cases of democratiza-tion, democracy arguably suffers from serious prob-lems of disaffection.1 Among the most acute
challenges to contemporary democracies is a pervasive ero-
sion of popular support for representative democratic insti-
tutions. Increasing discontent with politicians and political
parties is a key part of this erosion.
The widespread perception that parties are procedur-
ally necessary for the effective functioning of democracy
does not translate into their being widely supported or
respected. This syndrome is clearly evident, with parties
today often being seen as both the institution most sus-
ceptible to corruption,2 and one of the least trusted public
institutions. A growing number of U.S. citizens are increas-
ingly disenchanted with their political parties.3 In the Euro-
pean Union, parties enjoy less trust than any other private
or public institution—less than big companies or trade
unions, and far less than institutions such as the army or
police, or even the United Nations and the European Union
itself.4 Indeed, levels of distrust in political parties, in the
advanced industrial democracies and elsewhere, are now
so high that they are almost beyond scale.5
From this perspective, it is particularly important to
reflect on the functions traditionally assigned to parties in
the processes of democracy, and to ask how the apparently
declining capacity of parties to perform their representa-
tive functions can be reversed, or alternatively how both
parties and democratic systems more generally can adapt
to the shift of those functions to other arenas. Do parties
need to be reinvented? If so, what design tools are avail-
able, and how could they best be used?
Political science should be able to provide resources to
understand and perhaps to help to address these corrosive
tendencies and pressing concerns. But there is a strong
case for arguing that it has deprived itself of a capacity to
do so, due to a curious, persistent, and ultimately inde-
fensible divide between two distinct sub-disciplinary
domains: democratic theory (DT) and the study of polit-
ical parties (PP). Any meaningful discussion of concerns
with democracy and democratic legitimacy requires that
empirical developments are assessed with reference to theo-
ries of democracy and that normative postulates can be
evaluated in relation to empirical realities. The contempo-
rary challenges to political parties, as part of a broader
crisis of representation, heighten the degree to which the
empirical and the normative need each other as we seek
Ingrid van Biezen is Reader in Comparative Politics at the
University of Birmingham, UK (i.c.vanbiezen
@bham.ac.uk). Michael Saward is Professor of Politics at
the Open University, UK (m.j.saward@open.ac.uk). The
authors are grateful to Richard S. Katz and Jeremy Jennings
and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments
and suggestions. In developing our arguments, we also
benefited from conversations with Robert Dahl, Russell
Dalton, Ian Shapiro, workshop participants at the ECPR
Joint Sessions, and graduate students at Yale University.
Part of this research was supported by the British Academy
(research grant SG 38612).
| |



Articles
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592708080043 March 2008 | Vol. 6/No. 1 21
new ways to trace and express links between democracy as
an existing practice and democracy as an unfulfilled ideal.
In this light, it is regrettable that, despite their impor-
tance to one another, the current literatures on political
parties and normative democratic theory continue to
develop to an extraordinary degree in mutual isolation.
While assuming that political parties are inevitable for
modern democracy, empirical studies of contemporary par-
ties, party organization, and party systems tend to have
little to say about the varied meanings and possibilities of
democracy, and therefore of the varied potential roles of
political parties within it. Conversely, modern democratic
theory is noticeably silent on the question whether polit-
ical parties have a legitimate place and function in a democ-
racy. In this article we will back up these claims—noting
that where there are exceptions they tend to prove the
rule—and argue that this mutual neglect is a serious prob-
lem which threatens to prevent us taking advantage of
promising areas for potential mutual engagement. We
explore the key underlying reasons why democratic theo-
rists and scholars of political parties should so rarely take
on each others’ core topics and concerns, and sketch just
how this mutual disengagement is mutually impoverish-
ing. The article will, however, suggest ways forward by
pinpointing potentially productive areas of engagement
which, if pursued, might just serve to deepen our under-
standing of democracy’s present and its possible futures.
Finally, by way of illustration we indicate how building on
theory insights into deliberative democracy and party schol-
ars’ insights into party configuration and organization could
be productive—and, in the light of the pressures that par-
ties (and representation) are under, politically highly
relevant.
Political Theory versus Political
Science
The divide between democratic theory and the study of
political parties can be seen as one part of the broader
disconnection between the sub-discipline of political theory
(or political philosophy—the terms are taken as inter-
changeable for present purposes) and political science more
generally. Recently, Shapiro has argued that an ongoing
process of professionalization and specialization has disso-
ciated political philosophy from the rest of political sci-
ence, and has separated normative from empirical theory,
“with political philosophers declaring a monopoly over
the former while abandoning the enterprise of ‘positive’
political theory to other political scientists.” As a conse-
quence, “normative theory . . . is no longer informed, in
the ways that the great theorists of the tradition took it for
granted that political theory should be informed, by the
state of empirical knowledge of politics.” This separation
has not only resulted in an increasing tendency of norma-
tive political theory to downgrade concerns over practical
feasibility but “has also fed the tendency for empirical
political theory to become banal and method driven—
detached from the great questions of the day and focused
instead on what seems methodologically most tractable.”6
Arguably, modern political philosophers have always
been more aware of the nature of their activity and the
way in which their sub-discipline connects to the rest of
political science than their colleagues in other branches of
the discipline.7 Among political theorists in particular,
therefore, the problematic dissociation of political philos-
ophy from the wider activity of political science has not
gone unnoticed. Gunnell, in Between Philosophy and Pol-
itics, for example, expresses concern with the “alienation”
of political theory from substantive political problems.8
In Reappraising Political Theory, Ball suggests that political
philosophy develop some of the “sensibilities of those
among our fellow political enquirers who are convention-
ally classified as ‘empirical’ political scientists.”9 In Delib-
erative Democracy and Beyond, Dryzek observes a “near-
universal tendency among political theorists to treat
empirical reality in terms of a few stylized facts, rather
than attending seriously to the findings of empirical polit-
ical science.”10
Kelly suggests that, if political theory is to continue to
command interest and respect within the discipline, “it
does more to re-engage with political science,” which it
can do “by challenging the terms of much that goes on in
political science.” In so doing, political theory could pro-
vide a support structure for what political scientists do by
conceptual clarification and theory construction, and would
act to clarify and challenge the normative dimensions of
the theories and questions that political scientists work
with.11 At the same time, political scientists should take
more notice of the concepts and theories developed by
political philosophers. Indeed, Shapiro’s cited observa-
tions are more than a critique of political theory’s navel-
gazing. While he condemns the theorists for seeing
themselves engaged “in a specialized activity distinct from
the rest of political science,” his is as much an assault on
triteness and triviality in empirical political science as it is
on the narcissism of political theory.12
These overviews may seem exaggerated, but we would
agree that they are largely accurate. There are many pres-
sures which drive sub-disciplines away from mutual
engagement, from the internal organization of academic
departments to increasing journal specialization to cer-
tain research accounting and funding procedures. What-
ever the causes, the diagnosis is clear enough; to move
towards tentative prescriptions, we need to address a range
of problems that arise from this large-scale disjunction.
The specific case of the linking of democratic theory and
research into political parties is just one such problem,
though (as we hope to show) one of real significance.
Among the various modes of non-communication
between political philosophers and political scientists, our
| |



Articles | Democratic Theorists and Party Scholars
22 Perspectives on Politics
concern here centers on the meaning and interpretation
of “democracy.” We do not argue that theory and empir-
ical work on a range of democratic institutions have not
been mutually engaged—they have, in various ways. But
this work, it is fair to say, focuses much more on the
“hardware” of democracy rather than the “software” of
mediating institutions like political parties. For example,
Lijphart’s consensus and majoritarian models, Dahl’s
account of the constitutive features of polyarchy, Guini-
er’s discussion of electoral rules, and Mansbridge’s rethink-
ing of representation engage with characteristics and
trajectories of a range of background institutions—
electoral systems, electoral and other rights, executive
accountability, the accountability of individual members
of Congress, and so on.13 Such authors clearly engage
with democratic institutions to help to generate theoreti-
cal insights. Notwithstanding such efforts, engagement
between work on democratic theory and political parties
specifically has remained exceptional.
From that perspective, and with specific reference to
work in democratic theory and on political parties, a key
challenge for political theorists lies in fostering more crit-
ical conceptual engagement among scholars of political
parties and the elucidation of the implicit normative
assumptions underlying many of their approaches. Dem-
ocratic theorists, at their best, problematise democracy,
drawing out shifting and competing meanings. Some of
this work may involve uncomfortable implications for the
place of parties in democratic politics, today and in the
future. However, when addressing empirical reality and
advancing practical solutions for the improvement of the
quality of democracy, democratic theorists should be less
reluctant to acknowledge the reality (and indeed the poten-
tial) of the political party and to incorporate the empirical
findings of party scholars.
Party scholars, on the other hand, when addressing nor-
mative and empirical issues of democracy, could benefit
from developing a greater sensitivity to the broader signif-
icance of the place and role of political parties in modern
democracy, and a greater awareness of the conceptual and
theoretical dimensions underlying democracy. We will pick
up a range of such issues in what follows.
Back to the Future?
Both democratic theorists and party scholars could find
inspiration in the great thinkers of the past, as the two
particular ‘schools’ have not always been disconnected.
Indeed, until the mid-twentieth century it was often pre-
cisely through the concept of democracy that normative
political theory and empirical political science were closely
linked. In the eighteenth century, Hume was the first
among the major political philosophers to take up the
subject of parties.14 In his essay Of Parties in General (1742)
he observed that parties founded on some real difference
of interest (as opposed to affection) and political (as
opposed to religious) principles are typical of the modern
world: “Parties from principle, especially abstract specula-
tive principle, are known only to modern times and are,
perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phe-
nomenon that has yet appeared in human affairs.”15 At
best, however, Hume accepted parties only as an unpleas-
ant consequence of free government. Edmund Burke was
the first to see that see that parties had a positive and
necessary use for democracy. In Thoughts on the Cause of
the Present Discontent (1770) he made what has sub-
sequently been described as “the first argument in the
history of political philosophy for the respectability, not
merely the necessity, of parties.”16
Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, political philosophy gradually came to terms with
the continued institutionalization of political parties and
their de facto inevitability as permanent elements of the
political system (though strong anti-party sentiments con-
tinued to permeate many theories of government and
democracy). The reality of the political party received a
final and decisive push with the advent of mass democracy
and the introduction of universal suffrage. As the size of
the democratic polity increased with the consolidation of
large-scale nation-states, direct links between the state and
the individual became increasingly unrealistic, a fact which
further legitimized the status of parties as intermediary
institutions between individual citizens and the state. More
or less contemporaneous with this development was the
shift in the dominant meaning of democracy; in the late
1700s Madison dismissed democracy, understood as
Athenian-style direct democracy, in favour of republican
government. In just over 100 years, Madison’s republican-
ism was well on the path to becoming itself the dominant
meaning of democracy.
Until at least the early twentieth century, as the works
of major scholars of political parties such as Ostrogorski,
Michels, and Weber demonstrate, the empirical study of
political parties remained intimately related to democratic
theory.17 To be sure, Ostrogorski and Michels in particu-
lar were primarily concerned with democracy within par-
ties, and the undemocratic and oligarchic tendencies of
bureaucratic mass parties in particular, and not with democ-
racy as a political system based upon competition between
parties. However, their theoretical and empirical analyses
of the functioning of political parties are clearly related to
the theory of democracy. Ostrogorski’s solution to what
he saw as the suffocating internal discipline of mass par-
ties, i.e., to create a polity without permanent parties,
underlines how he sought to reconcile liberalism with the
idea of popular sovereignty, thus addressing a fundamen-
tal concern that pervaded much of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Michels implied that parties should be seen as obstacles
to, or the very antithesis of, democracy, at least to the
extent that the “iron law of oligarchy” should be seen also
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to apply to the organization of the state itself. Weberian
analysis, on the other hand, suggests that strong and respon-
sible political leadership may be necessary for the healthy
functioning of democracy, principally because it serves to
prevent the politicization of an unaccountable bureau-
cracy. On this view, a lack of democracy within parties is
not necessarily consequential for democracy at the system
level because, as Sartori would later put it, “democracy on
a large scale is not the sum of many little democracies.”18
The Mysterious Absence:
Contemporary Democratic Theory
and Parties
So, the deep linkage of party (and partisan) interests with
philosophical and theoretical reflection on democracy was
strong and varied in a range of classic sources. It was in the
twentieth century—and arguably in the 1960s and 1970s
in particular, as the behavioural revolution in political sci-
ence advanced while normative political theorizing suf-
fered something of a crisis of identity and relevance—that
the study of democratic theory and of political parties
separated and diverged. Empirical and institutional work
on democracy was still sometimes combined with theory
construction and conjecture, as we have seen. But parties
specifically tended to be bypassed by democratic theorists,
and those scholars specializing in political parties tended
to do so quite separately from the concerns of democratic
theorists. In this section we briefly offer support for our
view that this separation is real. In the next section, we
explore the more significant question about why this sep-
aration has occurred and been sustained.
Arguably it was Schumpeter in the 1940s who most
influentially reconciled parties with democracy, by defend-
ing a minimal conception of democracy in which the cir-
culation of party elites in power through elections became
both its essence and justification. In recent years, however,
the theory of democracy has by and large become detached
from analysis of the character and roles of political parties,
despite a few notable exceptions such as Robert Dahl or
Giovanni Sartori, both of whom have published norma-
tive studies of democracy as well as empirical studies of
democratic institutions and political parties. As Sartori
observes, however, as scholars of political parties we are
“travelling more and more through the ever-growing jun-
gle of party polities without really knowing where we
started, let alone where we are heading.”19 Even here,
these authors have often separated out consideration of
parties and issues in democratic theory; Democracy and its
Critics (Dahl) and The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Sar-
tori), arguably their major works of democratic theory
respectively, have little to say about political parties. And
key parts of Dahl’s work have displayed unresolved ten-
sions between his expression of the democratic ideal and
parties and other institutions which he regards as being at
the core of modern democracy or polyarchy.20 One can
criticize these tensions and still applaud the category-
crossing work of Dahl; the tensions themselves point
towards the agenda of work whose relative absence is the
very thing we are bemoaning here.
Schattschneider’s observation that “the political parties
created democracy and that modern democracy is unthink-
able save in terms of the parties”21 has become an oft-
cited conventional wisdom among party scholars. Parties
have come to be seen as necessary for democracy, even
amidst increasing concern that their actual functioning is
inadequate for a healthy performance of democracy.22
Underlying the debates about the contemporary per-
formance of existing parties and party systems, there are
fundamental disagreements about the meaning of democ-
racy and the role of political parties within it. What that
conception of democracy is, however, remains unclear.
Complaints about the decline of party, the growing dis-
engagement from partisan politics, increasing dissatisfac-
tion with and distrust in parties and politicians, the
weakening of their representational and governmental roles,
and the problems of accountability, responsiveness, and
legitimacy, all rest upon, usually implicit, normative
assumptions concerning what is valuable about democ-
racy and about how democracy should work.23 But with
relatively few exceptions,24 even when these assumptions
are made explicit, they generally are simply stated as self-
evident truths, rather than being recognized as conten-
tious choices.25
Just as scholars of political parties tend to disregard the
variety in conceptions of democracy, contemporary dem-
ocratic theorists generally fail to acknowledge the variety
in functions and types of party. If not ignored altogether,
parties are often at best understood one-dimensionally, as
monolithic entities or mysterious black boxes. In particu-
lar in varieties of democratic theory belonging to the strands
of participatory democracy and civic republicanism (includ-
ing recently prominent strands of deliberative democ-
racy), political parties are conspicuous by their marginality
or absence. Even in theories of democracy that are less
averse in principle to the notion of interest representation
and the existence of intermediary structures, the status
accorded to political parties is quite trivial. Theories of
associative democracy, for example, which argue for vol-
untary citizen associations as the central institutions of
governance, have little to say about the role of political
parties in democratizing civil society or the state, or the
extent to which self-governing voluntary associations should
replace or complement the activities of political parties.26
In the same vein, the more recent theories of deliberative
democracy, while not necessarily unsympathetic to the
notion of representation, define few, if any, of the linkages
between “representatives” and “constituents” in terms of
party, with parties typically regarded as belonging to the
wrong side of the aggregation-deliberation dichotomy.27
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More generally, indeed, the implicit understanding of rep-
resentation in political theory seems to be one in which
representation occurs through the presence or actions of
individual elected politicians conceived largely in isola-
tion from parties or party structures.
The absence of political parties from these domains of
democratic theorizing is quite stark, and is evident in a
range of contemporary democratic theory topics and
debates. Key parts of the literature on “participatory democ-
racy” in the late 1960s to the early 1980s bypassed parties
to look instead at functional and radically decentralized
modes of participation.28 Parties are rarely mentioned in a
prominent exploration of democracy’s “outer and inner
edges.”29 Fishkin largely sets parties aside from preferred
“deliberative polls” in “the quest for deliberative democ-
racy;”30 Gutmann and Thompson’s advocacy of a differ-
ent brand of deliberative democracy is profoundly focused
on principles, and parties do not get a mention.31
Parties play a marginal, and to a degree a suspect, role in
Young’s otherwise extensive examination of the politics of
inclusion and democracy,32 and the same is often true of
general texts that seek to engage democratic theory on a wide
canvas (e.g., works by Beetham and Saward).33 A rich array
of formal and informal institutions and practices bearing
on deliberation are considered in the key essays on deliber-
ative democracy gathered by Fishkin and Laslett,34 but par-
ties barely rate a mention as deliberative, non-deliberative,
or potential deliberative bodies or participants; Christiano
notes the role of parties as potential deliberative bodies, but
they play a strongly subordinate role to principles and more
hardware elements of his discussion of “fundamental issues
in democratic theory.”35 Similar comments can rightly be
made of other noted democratic theory texts, such as those
by Dryzek, Macedo, and Benhabib, that engage in partic-
ular with the dominant deliberative thread in democratic
theory.36 Implicitly, parties are not seen as real or ideal
vehicles of democratic deliberation—a key theme to which
we return in the final section. Muirhead has commented
rightly that “while there are many and varied strains of the
deliberative ideal—from abstract philosophical accounts
like those of Habermas and Rawls to quite practical treat-
ments like those of Gutmann andThompson or Fishkin—in
general, none give an extended role to party or partisan-
ship’.37 Parties likewise are also bypassed, for the most part,
in other leading democratic theory accounts of the ways in
which (it is argued) democracy needs to be reinvented or
reformed, for example in discussions of green democracy38
and cosmopolitan and transnational democracy.39
Of course this is a selective sample. Nevertheless read-
ers can judge for themselves our basic claim: contempo-
rary democratic theorists rarely consider the necessity, roles,
promise, or democratic character of political parties, and
often simply neglect them. Rather, they focus on an array
of principles, moral dilemmas, institutional hardware and
design, individuals as actors and citizens, “the people,”
and new forums and other institutions which may embody
democratic ideals. There are exceptions—Christiano to
some degree, Phillips and Budge for example40—but they
are isolated ones. It is something of an irony that in one of
the earliest and most influential articles in the dominant
deliberative democracy strand, Joshua Cohen noted that
“the question is how we can best approximate the delib-
erative conception. And it is difficult to see how that is
possible in the absence of strong parties, supported with
public resources.”41 Similarly, Bernard Manin insisted that
parties make an essential contribution to democracy.42 It
is fair to say that the suggestions of these early theorists of
deliberative democracy have largely been ignored since.
Why Democratic Theorists and Party
Scholars Don’t Talk to Each Other
With so many topics and concerns in common—not
least the fundamental health of democracy—why is there
such a divide between democratic theory and the study
of political parties? We have hinted at some reasons; in
this section we approach the issue explicitly and more
systematically. We think that there are at least four key,
and interrelated, characteristics of the different litera-
tures’ approaches to democracy within which the core
reasons can be located; these are referred to as “domains
of difference.” These domains are: (1) dominant epistemol-
ogy approach, addressing fundamental issues of how we
know what we know; (2) the level of analysis, dealing
with different tendencies to prioritize the focus on cer-
tain evident features of polities; (3) definitions of key
terms, above all democracy, and (4) positioning of analy-
ses on issues of substance and procedure. No doubt there
are different ways of carving up fundamental differences
dividing the two literatures concerned. But we hope to
show that these four domains are fundamental. Further,
there are clear relationships between the four domains.
For example, an epistemological approach that prizes nor-
mative thinking is more likely to emphasize substance
over procedure (or at least to see procedures in terms of
principled points of substance). Likewise, scholars of polit-
ical parties will in part emphasize procedures since their
epistemological preferences for empirical approaches induce
scepticism about positing essential substance. These dif-
ferent approaches have deep roots and extensive influ-
ence on the focus and style of the different literatures.
These characteristics, as well as the broader nature of the
different approaches, the reasons for them, and their con-
sequences, are schematically represented in table 1.
The first domain of difference concerns the different dom-
inant epistemological approaches of democratic theory and
the study of political parties. Although perhaps less directly
related to the treatment of democracy per se, these posi-
tions have an immediate bearing on it, as well as being related
to the other characteristics. Broadly speaking, democratic
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theory tends to prioritize normative approaches, concen-
trating on the ideals and fundamental principles of democ-
racy, while the study of political parties tends to prioritize
empirical approaches, focusing primarily on the workings
of democratic institutions in actual practice. The main rea-
son for this methodological difference is that democratic
theory largely emerged out of, and remains grounded in, a
philosophical tradition that favoursdeductive reasoning from
Table 1
Democratic Theory (DT) and the Study of Political Parties (PP): Different approaches to
democracy
Domain
of difference
Nature
of difference
Reasons
for difference
Consequences
of difference
Epistemological position DT: prioritizes normative
approaches
PP: prioritizes empirical
approaches
DT: grounded in a philosoph-
ical tradition that favours
deductive and axiomatic
reasoning
PP: grounded in a tradition
of logical positivism/
empiricism that favours
perception and observa-
tion
DT: strength of the argu-
ment arises from abstract
reasoning and internal
coherence; the idea is
more important than the
empirical examples; uses
selected and isolated
cases as occasional
illustrations
PP: based on the study of
empirical practice; strength
of the argument arises
from references to con-
crete external cases; norma-
tive assumptions are
absent or implicit
Level of analysis DT: focuses on macro/
micro level
PP: focuses on meso level
DT: is ‘grand theory’; con-
cerned with the constitutive
features of the system
PP: is ‘middle-range’
theory’; concerned with
processes within the
system
DT: object of analysis
focuses on the wider sys-
tem and the justification of
states; focuses on constitu-
tions and individual rights
as ‘hardware’ of the
system
PP: object of analysis
focuses on the mediating
structures between the
individual and the state;
focuses on parties as ‘soft-
ware’ of the system
Defining terms DT: sees ‘democracy’ as
an abstract and change-
able idea as well as a con-
tingent practice
PP: sees ‘democracy’ as
contextual and exogenous
to its object of analysis
DT: emerges prior to mod-
ern representative govern-
ment; continued scepticism
of large scale ‘democracy’
on the level of the modern
nation-state
PP: emerges after the
settled conviction that
systems of representative
government equal
‘democracy’
DT: nostalgia for earlier
conceptions of direct demo-
cratic and republican gov-
ernment; inherent
suspicion of intermediary
structures
PP: largely a-historical;
ignores the existence of
competing conceptions of
‘democracy’; operates
within uncontested param-
eters of ‘democracy’
Substance vs. procedure DT: emphasizes the sub-
stantive aspects of ‘democ-
racy’
PP: emphasizes the
procedural aspects of
‘democracy’
DT: uses a currency of
principles (e.g. equality,
freedom) which have a
timeless and moral quality
PP: focuses on how sys-
tems operate and how
timeless principles are
actualized
DT: focuses on (substan-
tive normative dimensions
of) policies
PP: focuses on (procedural
dimensions of) politics
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abstract axiomatic principles, while the study of political
parties is rooted in a later tradition of logical positivism that
favours empirical exploration and the verification and fal-
sification of empirically observable evidence.
This means that for the democratic theorist clarifying
and debating the democratic ideal remains more impor-
tant than (and the necessary precondition for) exploring
actual empirical examples. The primary force of the argu-
ment derives from abstract reasoning and internal coher-
ence rather than a correspondence between theoretical
claims and empirical reality (the latter is often more than
just a negligible concern, but not often with specific ref-
erence to political parties). Empirical examples serve a
purpose primarily as selective and isolated illustrations of
the argument. To scholars of political parties, on the other
hand, empirical observations are vital to theory building,
whether inductively or deductively conceived, and con-
tentions and claims only hold true to the extent that they
can be supported by empirical evidence. Normative ideas
are often taken to be largely irrelevant—it remains implicit
that we already know what democracy is, and why it is
valuable. From that perspective, arguments about ideal
models of democratic deliberation arising from specula-
tive contract theories (as Cohen’s does, through Rawls, for
example),43 may have points of interest but are unscien-
tific, speculative, and perhaps backward-looking.
For the study of democracy in particular, this means
that the concern of the democratic theorist lies primarily
with the foundations that constitute the democratic pol-
ity, while for the student of political parties it lies with the
actual functioning of the institutions within it. This brings
us to the second, and related, domain: the level of analy-
sis. Democratic theory and the study of political parties
see themselves as operating at different levels of generality.
Democratic theory is often grand theory, while the study
of political parties operates largely at the middle-range
level. While democratic theory focuses primarily on the
macro (or system) level and its links to the autonomous
individual at the micro level, the study of political parties
concentrates mainly on the meso level of the political sys-
tem. Because democratic theory is essentially concerned
with the constitutive features of the democratic state and
their moral justification, it tends to focus its attention on
the broader system. Moreover, modern democratic theory
arises largely from liberal traditions of philosophy. As con-
tractarian sub-traditions of liberal philosophy have been
extremely influential in democratic theory, these have biased
the latter towards the constitution of states rather than the
processes operating within states.44
Democratic theory, therefore, often concentrates on
questions of constitutionalism and individual rights, which
it sees as the important hardware of democracy. Parties are
seen as software and as less basic to democracy in tempo-
ral, organizational, deliberative, or normative terms. Dem-
ocratic theorists, indeed, convey real doubt as to whether
democracy does “need” parties; partisanship generally is
often seem as something to be overcome, an obstacle to
democratic reasoning,45 and parties can deflect concerns
with the common good (note the clear overlaps with themes
in classic historical contributions, discussed earlier). While
the study of political parties focuses on the intermediary
structures between the individual and the state, the higher
level of generality of democratic theory tends to deflect its
attention from specific institutions, such as political par-
ties, whose operation does not comfortably fit into its
broader intellectual orientation or framework. As a con-
sequence of its level of abstraction democratic theory is
concerned with the whole, not with parts; it takes a reso-
lutely system-level view of its object. This explains some
of its traditional suspicion of political parties, as a party is,
by definition, only part of the whole. Further, because
parties unite people on the basis of competing ideological
principles and opposing interests, they are not by their
very nature geared towards more objective perspectives on
the whole.46
Each of these concerns, in turn, has an impact on how
the fundamental concept at hand, democracy, is defined
and understood in the two literatures. With regard to the
defining terms, therefore, to study democracy means some-
thing altogether different for the democratic theorist than
it does for the scholar of political parties. This observation
brings into focus the third domain of difference. For the
democratic theorist, democracy is an abstract and change-
able idea as well as a contingent practice. For the scholar
of political parties, on the other hand, democracy is largely
contextual and exogenous to its object of analysis. In order
to understand why this should be the case it is important
to underline the sequence in which democratic theory
and the study of political parties developed in relation to
the establishment of representative government. Demo-
cratic theory developed prior to the emergence of modern
representative government. Until surprising recently
democracy meant direct, face-to-face democracy, a mean-
ing stretching back to its Greek origins over 2,500 years
ago. The idea of unmediated, face-to-face politics still hov-
ers in the background as an implicit—and sometimes fore-
grounded as an explicit—baseline against which to measure
degrees of democracy in different contexts.47 As a conse-
quence, there is a lingering, detectable apprehension about
the broadening of the notion of democracy to the level of
the modern nation state and thus (it is normally assumed)
consigning any notion of more direct, or strongly partici-
pative, democracy to the historical dustbin. As Dahl
observes, the large scale of modern nation-states created a
conflict “between the theory and practice of representa-
tive democracy and earlier conceptions of democratic and
republican government that were never wholly lost.”48
The skepticism of democratic theory towards large-scale
democracy is reflected in a certain “polis envy”49 and a
persistent suspicion of intermediary structures.50
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In addition, as we have hinted above, democratic theory
largely emerges out of traditions of thinking about poli-
tics which stress individualism, on the one hand, and the
collective (including the collective interest), on the other.
There is little scope for what lies in between that dyad, for
mediating institutions and organizations such as political
parties. In fact, the existence of political parties was fun-
damentally incompatible with both the liberal democratic
tradition rooted in the resolute individualism of Locke
and the radically communitarian and anti-representative
democratic tradition inspired by Rousseau, both of which
in their different ways are difficult to marry with partisan
institutions, which by their very nature both transcend
individual interests and refute the existence of some sort
of “general will.”51
The analysis of political parties, by contrast, emerged
only after the notion that systems of representative gov-
ernment are democracy had more or less settled. Studies
of political parties, therefore, tend to be rather a-historical.
They ignore the variety in both historical and contempo-
rary conceptions of democracy and tend to accept elec-
tions, and the narrow interpretation of representation
associated with them, as benchmark democratic practice.
Relatedly, they also tend largely to operate within the
uncontested parameters of existing democratic systems
without any systematic questioning of their democratic
quality. While many empirical studies of political parties
and democracy will accept the notion that democracy
belongs to the category of “essentially contested con-
cepts,” the literature is not very good at “making democ-
racy strange,” to use the old anthropological way of
formulating the first necessary step in analysis. Such
approaches can sometimes be seen as committing the “def-
initional fallacy”52 namely assuming that a system is dem-
ocratic simply because it fits a type that is commonly
regarded as being democratic.53
The fourth domain of difference is that of substance
versus procedure. Whereas democratic theory tends to
emphasize the substantive aspects of democracy, the study
of political parties emphasizes the procedural aspects of
democracy. To do political philosophy is to write about
morality, about issues pertaining to rightness and wrong-
ness, which lends itself to theorizing about substance,
not procedures.54 Democratic theory tends to use a cur-
rency of fundamental principles such as freedom, equal-
ity, and justice, which have a timeless and moral quality.
Detailed empirical examples may be explored, but these
tend to be selected in the light of, and strongly driven by,
principled ideals with deeper roots. The study of political
parties, on the other hand, focuses on how systems oper-
ate and concentrates on how these principles are deployed
in a core domain of actual democratic practice. This in
turn means that democratic theory is often influenced by
broader political philosophy tendencies to focus on the
substance of policy rather than on the political process,
since policies can, arguably, be right or wrong, moral or
not, in principle. Policies lend themselves to substantive
normative analysis, allowing political philosophers to stip-
ulate what states should do (or refrain from doing) in
policy terms, selectively ignoring the procedural aspects
of democracy that form the ground on which political
parties operate, thereby almost deliberately detaching itself
from ordinary politics.
Why Democratic Theorists and Party
Scholars Should Talk to Each Other,
and How They Could
There are many good reasons for rectifying the contem-
porary lack of communication between democratic theo-
rists and scholars of political parties. Political parties occupy
an ambiguous position in modern democracies, which is
in part a product of the tension between their de facto
inevitability as key institutions of modern democracy and
their increasing inability to perform the representative func-
tions that legitimized their emergence and that are widely
seen as essential to the quality of democracy. The central-
ity of political parties can be demonstrated empirically by
the fact that they are firmly rooted in the established west-
ern democracies, and have rapidly acquired relevance in
the more recently established democracies which have
emerged out of what Huntington has called the “third
wave,”55 to the point that it is difficult even to conceive of
a contemporary democratic polity without political par-
ties. However, the failure of the empirical study of parties
to take questions of democratic theory to heart, and to
identify the relationship between normative and institu-
tional prescriptions (difficult as it may be to unite the two
paradigms) is a cause for serious concern, particularly given
the important challenges faced by modern democracy.
Modern democracy, as Hardin puts it either “cannot
entail massive citizen participation or it is irrelevant to
actual practice in modern politics.”56 Modern democracy
thus depends on mediation, and therefore requires medi-
ators. Democratic theorists need to take on board much
more fully the mediating software—above all and despite
their many challenges, parties—at the meso level of poli-
ties. It is here that pristine conceptions and principles are
modified and acted out. In other words, it is crucial to
incorporate these mediating structures and linkage mech-
anisms into democratic theory, and it seems equally evi-
dent that it is precisely through the agency of party that
state and society can be interlinked. However inade-
quately they may do it, parties gather and bundle dispa-
rate preferences and interests and attempt to articulate
collective visions out of varied and diverse particularities.
Democratic theorists often propose new mediating
structures—deliberative bodies, participative budgeting,
and so on—but leap too blithely over the existing, if trou-
bled, core mediating devices, namely parties.
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Both theories of liberal democracy and deliberative
democracy offer some potential to extend and to recon-
nect in this respect, as neither is in principle averse to the
notions of representation and mediation. However, fur-
ther progress would require a deeper appreciation and analy-
sis of the place and functions of parties as the principal
mediators in the democratic system. Even arguments for
new mediating or representative institutions that might
afford a deeper realization of democratic norms in prac-
tice need to deal with the issue of whether they can or
should supplement or replace party-based processes.
What are some of the key areas in which this renewed
engagement should occur? Consider a snapshot of selected
core concerns of democratic theorists and party scholars
respectively:
Each of the items in the left column of table 2 can be
seen as democratic theory demands on democracy, and a
set of areas in which democracy might be extended or
deepened. They reflect the widespread conviction in dem-
ocratic theory that the process of democratization is always
unfinished, and that democracy is always an imperfectly
realized ideal. Each of the items in the right column, deriv-
ing largely from the study of parties and party systems,
can be seen as either constraints on the supply of democ-
racy or vehicles through which the demands might in part
be met. Both columns also include suggestions how both
fields might take on board and engage more directly with
each others’ concerns.
With regard to A, equality, democratic theorists could
gain by considering how, and to what extent, parties, in
present or transformed configurations, can act as vehicles
for the democratic ideal of equality. Discussions of equal-
ity lie at the heart of justifications of democracy,57 but
these are often individualized and decontextualized dis-
cussions. The capacities of parties to promote equality in
their internal structures, their incentives to foster proce-
dural equality in governance institutions, and their policy
programs for addressing wider social inequalities affecting
citizens’ sense of political efficacy and participation rates,
are all relatively neglected but critical parts of such discus-
sions. Party scholars could gain from attempting to pin-
point the extent to which different parties and party system
configurations realize the democratic ideal of equality in
practice. This might take the form of renewed, theory-
driven attention to the extent of openness and inclusion
of party members in internal structures. It may further
involve investigation of the commitments of parties to
democracy and the support of the democratic process;
contra Downs,58 do parties have an incentive to deepen or
bolster system-wide democratic practice, or are they in
fact vote-winning machines for whom “democracy” is one
more piece of handy rhetoric?
We return to B, deliberation, shortly, for reasons we
shall make clear.
With regard to C, participation, decentralizing tenden-
cies within democratic theory—oriented towards getting
power closer to the people—might engage much more
fully the local-national nexus in party systems and struc-
tures, and ask, for example, to what extent decentralized
parties might act as a surprisingly subversive vehicle for
disrupting the resolutely national (and therefore highly
indirect and often distant) focus of democratic politics.
Democratic theorists might also reflect on the role of par-
ties in linking the local with the national, or on empow-
ering the people through the agency of party in the
democratization of decision-making structures and gov-
erning processes at the level of the nation-state. And indeed,
since cosmopolitans and greens within democratic theory
have been concerned to explore democratization in the
international arena, links between parties in different coun-
Table 2
Core Concerns and Overlapping Interests of Democratic Theorists (DTs) and Party
Scholars (PPs)
DTs PPs
A1. The value and justification of democracy rooted in
equality r parties as vehicles of equality
A2. Hierarchical structures of political parties and
electoral representation r realization of political
equality
B1. The conditions for ideal democratic deliberation r
parties as deliberative bodies
B2. Electoral and party systems/party organization r
impact of institutional structures on the patterns of
democratic deliberation
C1. Decentralisation and subsidiarity to deepen
democracy/increase participation r local party
organizations as empowering institutions
C2. Centralized and nation-based organization of major
parties r effect of mechanisms of direct
participation on democratic quality
D1. Need for the inclusion of new voices and interests
(including the ‘politics of presence’) r ‘open party’
D2. Party systems and types of party organization r
effect of electoral strategies/party system
cartelization on capacity for inclusion
| |



March 2008 | Vol. 6/No. 1 29
tries, as well as the organization of international parties,
ought to be explored. Party scholars might take less for
granted the national basis of democracy and ask, for exam-
ple, to what extent the dominance of national party orga-
nizations underpins the persistence of a minimal democratic
politics and undermines a more diverse, local and even
direct or participatory democratic politics. They might
also further explore how the increased use of mechanisms
of direct democracy, both inside and outside party chan-
nels, for decision-making and candidate selection impact
on democratic ideals for deepening democracy.
For D, inclusion, democratic theorists’ concerns about
facilitating the representation of new and marginalized inter-
ests in democracies could focus less on general institutional
fixes (such as quotas for women) or exotic imports and cre-
ations (citizens juries, for example), and more on the dem-
ocraticpotential ofprovocative ideas like the“openparty”—a
party in which its grassroots members, and perhaps also sup-
porters more broadly, are responsible for setting political
and policy goals. In other words, they could engage more
fully in a discussion on how a deeper realization of demo-
cratic inclusiveness might be achieved through a modifica-
tion or transformation of the existing representative
institutions rather than ignoring the party-based process
or tacitly assuming that it is best replaced by other
structures. Studentsofparties, on theotherhand, could fruit-
fully consider the extent to which parties fail to prioritize
the inclusion of concerns of the marginalized in their
search for electoral pre-eminence and government office,
and how in turn they may unwittingly act as brakes on the
deepening of democracy. Do parties lack a democracy-
supporting incentive to build long-term capacity as
opposed to maximizing short-term gain? On the level of
the party system, they could examine the extent to which
the formation of “cartel parties” has encouraged the exclu-
sion or effective marginalization of certain interests and
thus undermined a more inclusive democratic politics, and
explore possibilities to counteract current trends towards
less inclusiveness.59
In all of these areas, and others, each camp has much to
learn—or perhaps more to the point, much to be pro-
voked by—in the different orientation of the other one.
So, democratic theorists need to engage more, for exam-
ple, with the constraints and opportunities which the real-
ities of parties and party systems embody with respect to
the realization of core democratic ideals. And party schol-
ars need to engage more with the demandingness, restless-
ness, and changeability of those ideals, as well as with
difficult issues of how far empirical realities offer a suffi-
cient realization of democratic ideals.
Clearly the four areas are closely related. Participation
is not the same as inclusion but the demand for one can
often be a demand for the other. Inclusion might involve
issues about citizenship, raising questions about the bound-
aries of the political community and who is to be included
in the equality concern. Deliberation is not necessarily a
basis of, or a producer of, equality, but issues of equal
access to deliberative forums are crucial to the claims of
deliberative theorists. We lay the issues out here as we do
for clarity’s sake.
Of course, it is one thing to call for more engagement,
and point towards how it might be done. It is tougher
actually to do the work. So let us try to put this partly
right by spelling out for illustrative purposes what it might
mean to follow our own injunction for our second dem-
ocratic demand B, deliberation. We do not have space to
be much more than indicative in so doing.
Scholars of political parties have largely ignored the
“deliberative turn” in democratic theory. And theorists of
deliberative democracy have largely ignored political par-
ties. Even when they recognize the limited contribution
deliberation can make to democratic politics and gover-
nance, democratic theorists still do not discuss parties.60
This may be because theorists see parties as part of the
problem of political disaffection and voter ignorance, and
not part of a potential solution. Or because the delibera-
tive ideal has roots in thinking oriented to the general
interest, roots which influence their preference for certain
alternative devices—citizens’ juries and deliberative polls
for example—and steer them away from suspect partisan
institutions like parties (and thus, according to Budge’s
critique, taking “the politics out of politics.”)61
But what if both party scholars and democratic theo-
rists took up Cohen’s early challenge to explore parties as
vehicles for deliberative democracy? Deliberation, theo-
rists argue, can produce more informed preferences and
enhance legitimacy, although the ultimate purpose of
deliberation—the education and development of citi-
zens, the forging of a broad consensus, etc.—has a real
impact on the sites and mechanisms of deliberative democ-
racy. Consider first parties themselves as sites of deliber-
ation. We need to accept, of course, that parties are
partisan, but that need not mean narrowly partisan. Par-
ties have to sell a general interest vision to voters. And,
especially in an era where relatively fixed class roots of
party ideologies are loosening, there is arguably more
scope for deliberation over alternative party visions, pro-
grammes, and policies. Parties could be umbrellas for
positive deliberation over alternative proposals, all still
within the broad ideological “frame” of the party. There
may be scope to increase party memberships (in steep
decline in many countries) if genuine opportunities to
deliberate over policy are seen to be available.62 Carefully
managed, rebranding a party as committed to internal
openness and transparency through deliberative pro-
cesses may carry strategic benefits—there is no need to
deny that parties are driven, at least in part, by vote-
seeking objectives. Internal deliberative forums need not
be non-partisan; deliberation that engages partisan stake-
holders can also be effective.63
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Analysts could also look at decentralist and consultative
mechanisms already present in party organization, explor-
ing and perhaps deepening democratic deliberation on
the back of them (with potential benefits in terms of iden-
tification, legitimation, and even strategic advantage). Such
mechanisms could include bottom-up policy-making,
degrees of local party autonomy, party primary elections
and other participative modes of candidate selection, and
party conferences. Further, there is little reason why more-
favoured deliberative mechanisms, such as deliberative polls,
could not be deployed within party debates.
Next, consider parties as potential promoters of societal
deliberation. Party competition clearly fosters societal delib-
eration, through the media and otherwise—observers
might analyze the quality and extent of this deliberation,
and how parties do (and might) contribute to both. Could
parties take part in policy and candidate debates more
often and more prominently—perhaps even to their stra-
tegic advantage? Could they, in this light, sponsor citizen’s
juries or consensus conferences, rather than the more nar-
row focus groups that are often more favoured by parties?
Even more broadly, what of the different incentive struc-
tures inherent in different electoral systems for promoting
inter-party and diffuse societal deliberation? Perhaps the
shift to cartel parties, ironically enough, could foster delib-
eration, since the latter is sometimes easier to engender in
more elite contexts.64
Observers might pay closer attention to deliberation
between parties in legislatures. To what extent are parties
vehicles for deliberation as well as representation in that
context? And how can the potential complementary nature
of these two roles be enhanced? Further, at a time when
environmental and other issues are leading us to question
the very idea of domestic policy, deliberation’s capacity to
work across borders and contexts may be enhanced by
parties engaging for example with sister parties in other
countries through policy deliberation. More generally, the
value of party-fostered diffuse and episodic societal delib-
eration, not confined to one specific mechanism or device,
has been under explored.
In these brief comments there is a range of hypotheses,
born of looking past the mutual disregard that is the core
topic of this article. Refining and exploring these hypoth-
eses would require new orientations for both democratic
theorists and party scholars. The former would need, for
example, to engage with parties as unavoidable, if flawed,
vehicles of policy aggregation and political representation;
to recognize deliberation’s limits; to work with institu-
tional constraints; and to recognize the grey zone between
particular and general interests. The latter would need, for
example, to accept that democracy is inevitably a norma-
tive notion and take on board the power of the delibera-
tive ideal; to recognize the potential of deliberative devices
as supplementing and potentially improving party legiti-
macy and procedures; and to recognize the importance of
critical questioning of party contributions to the quality
of democracy, and deliberation. By such routes, new ways
for scholars to address the widespread disaffection with
politics in general, and parties and politicians in particu-
lar, may be opened up. And that would be significant for
the relevance and utility of political science.
Conclusion
If it is true, as Bryce argued at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, that modern representative democracy can-
not function without political parties, current developments
indicating that parties are losing their capacity to act as
agents of representation have far-reaching implications for
the nature of democracy.65 In order to address the funda-
mental tension between the centrality of parties and their
marginalization in an area quintessential to any modern
democracy, both normative theories of democracy and
empirical studies of political parties are of vital impor-
tance. In particular when faced with the challenges of
consolidating more recently established democracies, resolv-
ing problems arising from the changing nature of parties
in the established democracies, or addressing the demo-
cratic deficit of the European Union and other transna-
tional organizations, it is imperative that empirical
observations can take guidance from normative theories
and that normative claims are grounded in empirical real-
ity. For that reason, the literatures on political parties and
democratic theory should engage more frequently, sub-
stantially, and imaginatively with one another. In this arti-
cle, we have outlined several of the reasons why the two
strands might have parted ways and sketched various ways
in which they could possibly re-engage with one another.
It is only when they do that we can try to make sense of
the place of parties in contemporary democracy and,
indeed, of the nature of modern democracy itself and its
potential futures.
Notes
1 See, for example, Pharr and Putnam 2000.
2 Van Biezen and Kopecký 2007.
3 American National Election Studies show, for exam-
ple, that in the late 1950s approximately 70 per cent
of the American public felt they could trust govern-
ment to do the right thing, or that politicians cared
what people think; see Dalton 2004. By 2004, these
figures had dropped to 46.5 per cent trusting the
federal government to do the right thing always or
most of the time, and only 34.3 agreeing that politi-
cians cared what people think (2004 ANES).
4 A recent Eurobarometer study (2003, 59.1), for
example, revealed that parties were the least trusted
of all institutions on which opinions were sought,
with an overall balance of trust of 59 per cent (i.e.
only 16 per cent of respondents trusting them and
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75 per cent distrusting them). The next least trusted
institution were big companies (28 per cent); trade
unions recorded a balance of trust of 13 percent,
the EU 6, the UN 12, the police 39, and the
army 42 per cent; Eurobarometer 2003, 59.1.
5 On the public images of parties, see Dalton and
Weldon 2005.
6 Shapiro 2002, 597.
7 Kelly 2006, 47.
8 Gunnell 1986.
9 Ball 1995, 60.
10 Dryzek 2000, 26.
11 Kelly 2006, 52.
12 Shapiro 2002, 596. See also Green and Shapiro
1994.
13 Lijphart 1999; Dahl 1989; Guinier 1995; Mans-
bridge 2003.
14 Sartori 1976, ch. 1.
15 Hume, quoted in Scarrow 2002, 35.
16 Mansfield, quoted in Scarrow 2002, 37.
17 Ostrogorski 1902; Michels 1962 [1911]; Weber
1946 [1918].
18 Sartori 1965, 124.
19 Sartori 1976, 24.
20 See the argument in Saward 2001.
21 Schattschneider 1942, 1.
22 This seeming incompatibility between the perceived
necessity of parties, on the one hand, and their
representative inadequacy, on the other, is indicative
of a changing conception of political parties and
democracy. More particularly, it reflects an ide-
ational transformation of political parties away from
the voluntary private associations which perform
public roles and occupy government positions, to
the party as a special type of public utility or public
good for democracy; Van Biezen 2004.
23 Daalder 2002, 54.
24 A noticeable exception is Katz 1997, who links the
questions and issues raised by normative democratic
theory to the empirical analysis of elections and elec-
toral systems. Other significant exceptions include Katz
and Mair 1995, who analyze various models of party
organization in relation to the underlying concep-
tions of democracy. See also Pomper 1992.
25 Katz 2006, for example, shows how various strands
of popular sovereignty and liberal theories of democ-
racy and competitive party systems contain widely
divergent assumptions with regard to a range of
issues, including the ideal number of parties, the
cohesiveness of parties, their goal orientation, the
internal constraints on the party leadership, or the
relationship between parties and social cleavages.
26 See for example Hirst 1994. A compelling account of
a highly decentralized democracy based on service-
delivery throughvoluntary associations,Hirst’s approach
leaves major gaps in terms of where persisting national
parliamentary and party politics may fit. His schema
clearly allows for them in a federated structure, but
they are left largely undiscussed.
27 Johnson 2006, 48.
28 See for example Pateman 1970, Bachrach 1967, and
Barber 1984. MacPherson’s advocacy of a Soviet-style
pyramidal party structure was an exception of sorts,
but was based largely on a rejection of empirical reali-
ties of existing political parties; MacPherson 1977.
29 Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999.
30 Fishkin 1991; Fishkin and Luskin 2000.
31 Gutmann and Thompson 1996.
32 Young 2000.
33 Beetham 1999; Saward 1998.
34 Fishkin and Laslett 2003.
35 Christiano 1996.
36 Dryzek 2000; Macedo 1999; Benhabib 1996.
37 Muirhead 2006, 715; see also Budge 2000.
38 Dobson 1996; Dryzek 2000; Eckersley 2004.
39 Held 1995; Dryzek 1999.
40 Christiano 1996; Phillips 1995; Budge 1996, 2000.
41 Cohen 1989, 32.
42 Manin 1987, 357.
43 See Saward 2000.
44 Some theorists have expressed frustration at how
general normative prescriptions are discussed in
isolation from their institutional implications or
embodiment (e.g. Smith 2000).
45 Muirhead 2006.
46 Debate about the often blurred distinction between
theory and ideology raises a further issue. One can
argue that normative political theories are not as
different from party ideologies as their progenitors
often imply. Such theories can be seen as particularly
sophisticated versions of partisan ideological argu-
ments, expressed in a different idiom but belonging
ultimately to the same genus.
47 Barber 1984.
48 Dahl 1989, 30.
49 Fishkin 1991, 119 n.31, attributes this term to
Bruce Ackerman.
50 There are varied suggestions in contemporary demo-
cratic theory that proximate or face-to-face politics is
superior to mediated or distant connections. Al-
though the language of “authenticity” is often
treated with scepticism in their writings, Fishkin and
Luskin’s (2000) account of the deliberative poll,
Dryzek’s (2000) account of localism and ecology,
and Phillips’s (1995) work on the ‘politics of pres-
ence’ all display something of this tendency.
51 Or, as Daalder argues, the source of the rejection of
party can be found in two bodies of thought. On
the one hand, there were the defenders of the tradi-
tional political order “who saw in the rise of party an
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unwanted invasion of the terrain of the state, which
as the guardian of long-term transcendental interests
threatened to fall victim to private interests of a
short-term nature.” On the other hand, there were
the defenders of the sovereign and free individual,
“who opposed what they regarded as they tyranny of
party, which would do away with freedom of indi-
vidual action and thought for the sake of collectivist
organizations led by irresponsible elites”; Daalder
2002, 41.
52 Holden 1974.
53 See the discussion of this and related issues in Skin-
ner 1973.
54 For a good example of the tensions between sub-
stance and procedure in recent democratic theory
building—and the perceived need to defend oneself
against charges of “proceduralism”—see Gutmann
and Thompson 2003.
55 Huntington 1991.
56 Hardin 1999, 169.
57 Equality above all other values is invoked in philo-
sophical discussions of democracy’s value. See Dahl
1989, Saward 1998, and Beetham 1999.
58 Downs 1956.
59 Inter-party relations in the era of the cartel party,
according to Katz and Mair 1995, are characterized
by a pattern of inter-party collusion rather than
competition, whereby the main parties work to-
gether and take advantage of the resources of the
state to ensure their collective survival, making it
difficult for newcomers to enter the system and
challenge the status quo.
60 See Shapiro 1999; Walzer 1999.
61 Budge 2000.
62 See, for example, Mair and van Biezen 2001.
63 Hendriks, Dryzek, and Hunold 2007.
64 On elitist tendencies in a focus on deliberation, see
Offe 1997.
65 Bryce 1921, 119.
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